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Elisabeth Zoller 13 begins Part I with observations on "The Distinc­
tion between Man and the Citizen in the Declaration of 1789: Past 
Significance and Contemporary Relevance." She examines the tensions 
that exist between the concept of "natural rights" and that of "civil 
rights" granted by the state. Then she goes on to discuss, in a penetrating 
and original way, two propositions that at first appear paradoxical, but 
when skillfully explicated reveal their power and perverse inner logic. 
First, that "government, and government alone, can 'secure,' 'preserve.' 
enforce human rights," but that, consequently, "the more we extend the 
rights of man internationally, the more we diminish the rights of the 
citizen domestically." 
Yves Jeanclos analyzes 14 the social and legal significance and 
importance of the Declaration in 18th-century France. Jeanclos stresses 
the influence of indigenous French liberalism, particularly that of 
Montesquieu, over American tutelage in the formulation of the Dec­
laration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen in 1789. From here, he 
proceeds to amplify Zoller's insistence on the symbiotic relationship 
between government power and the preservation of rights, by reminding 
us, again in a form that appears superficially paradoxical, that "the 
Declaration of 17 89 is interested ... [in] the concept of man versus the state, 
or rather man in the state." He then undertakes to examine the economic 
consequences of this Janus-faced solicitude, illustrating for us how the 
Constituent Assembly, in attempting to protect "the new man ... homo
oeconomicus" not only "from all judicial and economic chains, but 
also ... against his own penchant for economic submissiveness," suc­
ceeded instead only in "smothering" him. 
Stanley Hoffmann 15 offers "A Comparison of the French and 
American Conceptions of Human Rights." In his analysis, he reprises 
Zoller's distinction between the "rights of man," or "natural rights," and 
the "rights of citizens," or "civil rights." He then proceeds to trace the 
historical association of the "natural rights" tradition, from Montesquieu 
through the French Revolution and down to the present, primarily with 
concern for individual and political rights; and that of the "civil rights" 
tradition, from Rousseau through the Revolution and down to the 
present, primarily with concern for economic and social rights. Hoffmann 
illustrates the practical, long-term consequences of these associations in 
xvii 
agreement on the need to give priority to a more urgent task." 12 
It should not surprise us, then, that a document of such universally­
acknowledged centrality to the Revolution and its significance should 
also constitute an important point of departure for the authors whose 
observations are included in this collection. Yves J eanclos, for example, 
asserts simply that: "The Universal Declaration of the Rights of Man 
adopted the 10th of December 1948 by the General Assembly of the 
United Nations is a continuation of the Declaration of 1789." Elizabeth 
Zoller disagrees, saying that the 1948 U .N. Declaration hedges, and the 
1789 Declaration does not, on the question of whether human beings 
possess natural rights ("rights of man") anterior to being granted civil 
rights ("rights of the citizen"). Valerie Epps also disagrees, but in a 
different way. She argues that the 1948 Declaration goes well beyond 
the enumeration of individual and political rights to be found in the 1789 
Declaration, and well beyond anything that is implied therein, by 
introducing economic, social, and collective rights. Thus, she says, the 
1948 U.N. Declaration is no mere "continuation" of the 1789 Declaration, 
but an important expansion on it, by which we "turn another corner of 
the revolution and begin to deemphasize our rights as individuals in 
order to pursue some of our collective rights." Without specifically 
mentioning the 1948 Declaration, Stanley Hoffmann endorses Epps's 
position that the recognition of economic, social, and cultural "collective" 
rights represents not an extension of the 1789 Declaration, but a 
portentous expansion beyond it. He insists, however, that such "col­
lective" rights are neither less "real" than the individual ones catalogued 
in 1789 nor any less "protections against arbitrariness." And, similarly, 
Francis Rosenstiel also stresses the need to move beyond "the indis­
pensable civil and political rights" recognized in 1789 to guarantee 
"economic and social rights" for "those second-class citizens ... for 
whom [political rights] have still little point as long as the basic needs 
of life are not satisfied." 
Such is the nature of the lively debate to be found in the articles that 
follow. These papers attempt to articulate some of the many ways in 
which the French Revolution and its principal political/cultural artifact, 
the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen, are connected 
















you highly prize." There is nothing to add to this profound observation. 
We may perhaps give a concrete example to illustrate the point. No piece 
of legislation illustrates this idea better than United States antitrust laws. 
The antitrust laws were enacted to protect competitors and consumers 
from the unilateral or concerted exercise of market power. This is a 
typical example where action by the Government-under the form of 
legislation-is necessary to secure and preserve the natural rights of 
other men. The State has to intervene as an umpire between conflicting 
rights. In that case, if there were no government, we would have no 
rights, except for those of us strong enough to enforce their own rights, 
perhaps at gun-point. 
Clearly therefore, the true, real human rights can only be those of 
the citizen. Human rights are elusive to grasp without being transformed 
into civil rights, that is to say, without-as the French Declaration 
indicates-their limits set by the law (article 4) and their affectiveness 
guaranteed by a public force (article 12). Therefore, the most important 
step is accomplished by what Bracton called the constitutio libertatis, 
in other words, by the enactment of a Constitution. The Constitution is 
the cornerstone of liberty and its best guarantee. This is precisely what 
article 16 of the Declaration says: "Any society in which the guarantee 
of rights is not assured .. .lacks a constitution." Here again we find 
considerable similarity between the views of the National Assembly 
and the Founding Fathers. Looking at theF ederalist, we come across the 
same idea. I am referring to the letter in which Hamilton commented 
upon the opening of the American Constitution ("We, the people ... do 
ordain and establish this Constitution") as follows: "Here is a better 
recognition of popular rights than volumes of those aphorisms which ... 
would sound much better in a treatise of ethics than in a constitution of 
government." The only French Constitution which may be considered 
as having trusted Hamilton so to speak, is the Constitution of the Third 
Republic which refrained to allude in any manner to the Declaration of 
1789 and which, despite this omission, established the most liberal 
government ever to rule the country. The importance of a constitutional 
enactment as a requisite for any human rights enforcement mechanism 
leads me to my third and final set of remarks. 









































In the United States, the mode of interpretation through the mecha­
nism of judicial supremacy-that is the judiciary arrogating to itself the 
power to be the final interpreter of the scope of the powers of the three 
branches of government--came about largely by historical chance and 
probably through the personal animosities of the Chief Justice of the 
Supreme Court and the President of the day and not through any 
overriding sense of the Framers that such was the best system. I happen 
to think that judicial supremacy has worked fairly well in the American 
context, not because of any pristine sense that this is the best principle 
devised by man but rather because of the particular social and political 
history of the United States itself and the numerous shortcomings in the 
personnel of the legislature and the executive. 
Limitation on central government was to be effected by a tripartite 
system of government with various mechanisms for checking each 
others powers, with separate powers to some extent but with overlap­
ping powers in other significant enterprises. The powers of the legislature, 
executive, and judiciary were spelled out, and limitations were spe­
cifically placed upon state power. The people, as such, do not receive 
much mention except that they were to elect their representatives in the 
House. "They," of course, meant white, male property owners. Limited 
black suffrage was not contemplated until the Fifteenth Amendment of 
1870, and female enfranchisement did not take place until 1920. The 
notion of equal participation, one person--one vote, based on personhood 
alone, did not emerge until the 1960's. It is salutary to remember that as 
Jefferson noted in his discussion of the wording of the Declaration of 
Independence that: "The clause ... reprobating the enslaving the inhab­
itants of Africa was struck out in complaisance to South Carolina and 
Georgia, who had never attempted to restrain the importation of slaves, 
and who on the contrary still wished to continue it." Indians are 
specifically referred to as "merciless ... savages." 
The Constitution then is largely power-granting, power-dividing 
and mechanistic in its approach. It is not, largely, a manifesto of declared 
rights-except perhaps the general great right to live under a govern­
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